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Unenforceability
Lee Petherbridge*
Jason Rantanen**
R. Polk Wagner***
Abstract
The patent doctrine of inequitable conduct—which allows a
patent to be held unenforceable on the basis of misbehavior by the
applicant during patent prosecution—has been the subject of
intense criticism from the bench and bar alike. And yet to date
there has been no systematic attempt to determine whether the
doctrine is or is not working as theorized. This study fills that gap.
We evaluate the performance of the inequitable conduct doctrine
with a novel methodological approach: by empirically
characterizing
the
differences
between
patents
found
unenforceable and several other types of patents (unlitigated,
litigated, invalid, obvious, and underdisclosed), we use those
differences to reveal the real-world impact of the inequitable
conduct doctrine. We find that patents held unenforceable have
clear hallmarks of risky prosecution behavior, such as longer
pendency and fewer disclosures of prior art, as compared to all
other types we studied. These results indicate that the doctrine is
likely operating better than conventional wisdom would suggest.
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I. Introduction
Patents are deeply infused with public interest
considerations: they are a government grant of power to an
individual or company to (potentially) affect the marketplace.1 As
such, most conceptions of the patent system involve a balance
between private and public rights, and virtually every aspect of
the patent law is directed toward creating or enforcing that
balance.2 By punishing the socially detrimental behavior of
patentees before the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), the doctrine of inequitable conduct is in some sense no
different: its conventionally understood purpose is to protect the
administrative integrity of the patent system.3

1. See generally Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual
Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837 (2007) (discussing
and defining market power in the intellectual property context).
2. See Yaniv Gal, Patent Law in the Antitrust Scope: Between Social
Advancement and Competitive Impingement, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 367, 405 (2011) (“The disclosure requirement, joined with the enablement
element, aims to enhance welfare by enabling other manufacturers to replicate
the patent, once it enters public domain. This preserves an adequate patentcompetition balance.”).
3. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1103 (4th ed. 2007) (“The administrative process of the
U.S. patent system relies on the applicant and the examiner to determine
whether an invention is patentable, and if so, what its proper scope should be.”).
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At its core, inequitable conduct emanates from the historic
equitable doctrine of “unclean hands,” generally stated as “he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”4 In the
patent context, the concept is that a patentee may not seek to
enforce rights that were obtained by “fraud against the public.”5
For inequitable conduct purposes, fraud against the public is
defined as abuses of the patent prosecution process. The doctrinal
rubric asks whether a patent applicant either failed to disclose
information material to patentability or made misrepresentations
to the Patent Office that were material to patentability,6 and if
so, whether the nondisclosures or misrepresentations were made
with an intent to deceive the Patent Office into allowing patent
claims to issue.7 Assuming the answers to both the materiality
and intent inquiries meet threshold levels, a trial judge has the
discretion to remedy an applicant’s inequitable8 behavior by
declaring involved patents unenforceable.9 An unenforceable
patent is effectively useless to the patentee (except as a source of

4. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814 (1945) (“The guiding doctrine in this case is the equitable maxim that ‘he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’”).
5. See id. at 816 (“The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a
patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable
conduct.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2013) (“A patent by its very nature is affected
with a public interest. . . . [N]o patent will be granted on an application in
connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted.”).
6. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“Applicants for patents are required to prosecute patent applications in the
PTO with candor, good faith, and honesty. . . . A breach of this duty constitutes
inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct includes affirmative misrepresentation
of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
material information.”).
7. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing the standard for determining if misstatements were
intentional and thus made to deceive).
8. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating the process and burden of proof for a showing of
inequitable conduct).
9. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant part en banc) (“When a court has finally
determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims
during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered
unenforceable. We, in banc, reaffirm that rule.”).
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“prior art”), and importantly, the unenforceability applies to all
claims of that patent and even closely related patents.10
In theory, inequitable conduct plays an important role in
enforcing the relationship between the patentee and the patent
examiner (who is, of course, acting as an agent for the public).
The patentee will often be best positioned to know and report
information relevant to her invention’s patentability, whether
related to prior art, dates of invention, and the like. Material
nondisclosure of such information (or misrepresentations) would
obviously tilt the patent prosecution process unjustifiably in the
applicant’s favor. And the fact that patent prosecution is
generally ex parte only reinforces the need for the inequitable
conduct doctrine.
Or at least that’s the theory. In recent years, inequitable
conduct has come under attack, in large measure because of a
widely held view that the doctrine is over-asserted in patent
litigation.11 That it might be over-asserted is not altogether
surprising. First, the remedy of unenforceability is a very
powerful one—rendering all claims of a patent (and even those in
related patents) effectively void.12 A defendant who wins on
inequitable conduct has likely achieved a victory that proving
invalidity of claims cannot provide in terms of the scope of the
effect.13 Second, in many cases the information that can be used
10. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–
89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and
applications in the same technology family.”); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco
Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809–12 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (describing how inequitable
conduct regarding one patent can affect the validity of others that are closely
related).
11. For some examples, see generally Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable
Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 215, 215 (2010); Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of
the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37,
99 (1993); John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent
Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988);
Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1332 (2009); Melissa F.
Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, at
3 (2008).
12. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he remedy for inequitable
conduct is the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law. . . . [I]nequitable conduct regarding
any single claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.”).
13. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d
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to develop a claim of inequitable conduct (typically the
nondisclosure of prior art) overlaps with the type of information
that would be used to show invalidity, and yet inequitable
conduct does not require proof that the invention was actually
unpatentable.14 Thus, allegations of inequitable conduct have
been described as a “plague”15 by judges, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gradually attempted to
tighten up the standards for finding inequitable conduct—
presumably out of a hope to reduce the incidence of assertions of
the doctrine.16 The patent bar has also pressed Congress for
protection from the workings of the doctrine. Congress has
responded with a supplemental examination provision,17 which
can be used to cure all but the most extreme forms of inequitable
conduct.18
Thus, there is a substantial question of whether the doctrine
of inequitable conduct is working to advance its theoretical goals
or is instead an ineffective and costly component of an alreadycomplex patent enforcement regime. And although a few scholars
have analyzed the inequitable conduct doctrine empirically,
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (describing inequitable
conduct as an “atomic bomb” and the wide reaching effects it has on litigation).
14. Courts decide issues of patent validity and enforceability separately.
See, e.g., Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1150
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment of invalidity based solely on
finding of inequitable conduct).
15. See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (“We add one final word: the habit of charging inequitable conduct in
almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague. . . . [Lawyers]
destroy the respect for one another’s integrity, . . . that used to make the bar a
valuable help to the courts in making sound disposition of their cases.”).
16. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291–
93 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing the efforts of courts to make the standards for
finding inequitable conduct more stringent); Jason Rantanen & Lee
Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L.
& TECH 226, 245–50 (2011–12) (describing the effect of Therasense on patent
litigation and the inequitable conduct doctrine).
17. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12(a), 125
Stat. 284, 325 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2012)) (“A patent owner may
request supplemental examination of a patent in the Office to consider,
reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent . . . .”).
18. See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention
Registration: The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 24, 24–27 (2011) (describing and analyzing the supplemental
examination provision).
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nearly all prior work has been directed at the incidence of
inequitable conduct claims and the end results in litigation and
thus shines very little light on the relationship between the
inequitable conduct doctrine and its theoretical role in the patent
system.19 A prior study by two of us analyzed the doctrine in more
systematic
depth,
revealing
that
determinations
of
unenforceability are typically based on acts that could cause
patent claims to issue that should not, cause claims to issue that
are of inappropriate scope, and cause claims to issue in a manner
or sequence that could unfairly advantage one competitor over
another.20 Taken together, the prior work can be read to suggest a
nexus between the doctrine of inequitable conduct and its
theoretical role in the patent system, but results are more
suggestive than conclusive. This project seeks to fill that gap.
Although our research question is the performance of a legal
doctrine—inequitable conduct—our experimental design is novel
in approach and does not depend on an analysis of case law.
Instead, we build several datasets that allow us to compare the
characteristics of the patents involved in inequitable conduct (and
19. See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 11, at 1348–61 (analyzing the
prevalence of inequitable conduct); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209,
211–13 (2001) (addressing inequitable conduct among other doctrines when
comparing patentee win rates and recoveries in cases tried before juries and
judges); Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in
Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 607–15 (2009)
(analyzing court findings of inequitable conduct using statistics); Kevin Mack,
Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing
Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155 (2006) (discussing the
frequency with which inequitable conduct is pled); Katherine Nolan-Stevaux,
Note, Inequitable Conduct in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 160–64 (2005) (evaluating the number and success of
frivolous inequitable conduct allegations); see also Donald R. Dunner, J. Michael
Jakes & Jeffrey D. Karceski, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit Patent
Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 156, 173 tbl.4 (1995) (examining
inequitable conduct as part of a study into whether the Federal Circuit is propatentee).
20. See Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen, & Ali Mojibi, The Federal
Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
1293, 1324–29 (2011) (reporting acts such as failing to disclose prior art patents
and publications, failing to disclose experimental data, relying on false data,
filing false affidavits, excluding inventors from an application,
mischaracterizing art or other information, inappropriately paying a small
entity fee, or inequitably seeking a petition to make special).
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most especially those patents found to be unenforceable after
years of litigation) with other patents, both similarly situated and
not. That is, we exploit the commonality among reported patent
litigations—that they all involve patents—to isolate the
characteristics of patents that are most likely to be held
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. By examining those
characteristics and comparing them to characteristics of other
sets of patents (unlitigated, litigated, invalid, obvious, and
insufficiently described), we are able to draw some conclusions
about the way inequitable conduct is working in the real world,
and the role the doctrine plays in the patent system.
What follows moves in three parts. In Part II we describe our
analytical techniques in more detail, discussing the research
design and the data we used for the study. In Part III we present
our results, and provide our interpretation and analysis. Finally,
in Part IV, we discuss the implications of our findings on the role
of inequitable conduct as well as some future applications of the
techniques we use in this project.
II. Research Design and Data
A. Research Design
Our research question is whether the legal doctrine of
inequitable conduct is (or is not) operating according to its
theoretical basis in the patent law. That is, we want to explore
whether inequitable conduct polices socially undesirable
applicant behavior before the USPTO and thus helps to prevent
fraud on the public.21 As we noted briefly above, we have chosen a
research strategy that uses the patents involved in inequitable
conduct cases as an instrument of measurement—rather than
more conventional techniques related to case law analysis.22

21. See Michael Buschbach, An Improved Framework for Analyzing
“Substantially Similar” Patent Claims with Respect to the Inequitable Conduct
Defense, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 325, 332–33 (2009) (describing the way
inequitable conduct provides a check on undesirable patent application
behavior).
22. See supra Part I.
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The impetus for this approach is threefold. First, although
each patent granted is distinct, a large number of those
distinctions (for example, subject matter, complexity, and
prosecution history) are amenable to empirical characterization,
and that data is readily available. Second, although patent
litigations vary widely in terms of scope, complexity,
jurisdictions, and so forth, there is at least one measurable
commonality among them all: they must involve at least one
patent (and that patent will itself be measurable, as noted above).
And third, there is an increasing awareness among patent
researchers that patents that are litigated are systematically
different than patents that are not.23 Thus, it stands to reason
that patents that are litigated with different intensities or based
on different legal claims should also have systematically different
characteristics.24 If the third point above is true (and we show it
is, below),25 then the patents which are—after years of high-cost
litigation—held unenforceable should be different from other
patents, even other highly litigated patents. And those
differences in patent characteristics should reflect something
about the legal standards applied.
Therefore our basic research design is to identify and
characterize any measurable differences between patents that are
held to be unenforceable due to inequitable conduct and other
types of patents, and use those differences to evaluate the
performance of the inequitable conduct doctrine.
Of course, there is an initial question: how, hypothetically,
might unenforceable patents differ from other patents? As
discussed above, the theory of the doctrine of inequitable conduct
is that it polices the relationship between patent applicants and
the USPTO, and provides incentives to fully disclose known
information and avoid misrepresentations.26 If this legal theory is
23. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465–
76 (2004) (comparing litigated patents and unlitigated patents).
24. Because patent litigation is a private enterprise, the differences among
patents involved in litigation reflect choices made by patentees, accused
infringers, and courts, which obviously are strongly affected by the legal
standards applied.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–
89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court embraced these reduced standards for intent
and materiality to foster full disclosure to the PTO.”).
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correct—if inequitable conduct performs this policing function—
then how would unenforceable patents differ from others? Our
initial answer is that unenforceable patents should have
characteristics that reveal forms of risk taking in prosecution.
The answer follows readily from the policing theory of
inequitable conduct. If inequitable conduct punishes those in
patent prosecution who fail to disclose known information or
intentionally fail to take due care to avoid material
misrepresentations, then the prosecution of the patents (and thus
eventually the issued patents) the doctrine identifies should
reflect a greater risk of such behaviors. In addition, because the
penalty for inequitable conduct is substantial—the involved
patent as well as closely related patents may be held
unenforceable, and attorneys involved may experience adverse
professional consequences27—an applicant is most likely to risk
inequitable conduct only when (at least in the applicant’s
calculus) the reward of a patent grant is greater than the product
of the probability of detection and the consequences of detection.
This suggests that not all patent applications will be tainted by
inequitable conduct. But if one assumes that applicants will risk
deceptive behavior in some fraction of applications so that there
will be some patents that are granted where the prosecution was
tainted by inequitable conduct, then theory suggests those
patents should be characterized by risky prosecution behavior. It
follows that if the legal doctrine is working as theorized—so that
patents tainted by inequitable conduct are systematically more
likely to be held unenforceable—such patents should, we think,
have characteristics that reveal risky prosecution behavior. Those
characteristics may include:
More parent applications and/or a longer pendency in
prosecution. As other studies have shown, more parents and
longer prosecution pendency are related to a higher likelihood of
27. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 766 (2009) (describing this); see
also Brief for 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly and Company as
Amici Curiae in Support of No Party at 2, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 04-CV-2123, 04-CV-3327, 04-CV3732, 04-CV-3117), http://www.patentlyo.com/ts.enbanc.elililly.pdf (discussing
the personal impact of inequitable conduct claims on patent prosecutors at Eli
Lilly).
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litigation.28 But beyond that, applicants who use the continuation
process are likely more confident in the value of the invention if
patented (longer and more complex prosecutions cost more
money), and are more willing to exploit the rules of patent
prosecution for an advantage.29 Also consider that each filing
with the USPTO represents an opportunity for inequitable
conduct to occur, whether by failing to fully disclose or by
misrepresentation. Thus, patents with longer and more complex
prosecution histories should have a higher likelihood of being
found unenforceable.
Fewer disclosed prior art references. We think a paradigmatic
example of risky prosecution behavior is less disclosure of prior
art references. Of course, because there is no search requirement,
the absence of disclosure of prior art is not itself a signal of illicit
behavior,30 but we think that applicants who take higher risks in
prosecution are extremely likely to disclose less than those who
take lower risks—whether because of less searching for prior art
(a form of willful blindness,31 perhaps) or simple nondisclosure of
known art. Thus, patents showing fewer references should have a
higher likelihood of unenforceability.32
28. See Allison et al., supra note 23, at 438 (adducing characteristics of
patent value including small-entity status of the filer, number of claims, length
of time in prosecution, number of patent-family members, number of forward
citations, and patent age at the time of litigation).
29. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d. 867,
874–76 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (discussing the propriety of this strategy).
30. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Nor does an applicant for patent, who has no duty to conduct a
prior art search, have an obligation to disclose any art of which, in the [district]
court’s words, he ‘reasonably should be aware.’”).
31. Willful blindness has two basic requirements: “First, the defendant
must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists.
Second, the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that
fact.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
32. Disclosure seems to be ambivalent to value. On the one hand, it is
commonly believed that a patent can be marginally strengthened by the citation
to more prior art references. Thus, if there is a perception that a patent will be
valuable, it makes sense to take on the cost of strengthening it by adding art to
the file. On the other hand, failing to disclose art—especially art that is material
to patentability—might facilitate issuance and help the patentee realize value.
In addition, anxiety concerning what the examiner might do with submitted art
could discourage citation to art in some cases. Although recent work presents
results suggesting that to the extent applicants experienced this anxiety, it may
not have been well founded. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley &
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More patent claims. More claims can often result in greater
subject matter coverage and a greater ability to use a patent to
affect competition. However, drafting and prosecuting larger
numbers of claims is expensive.33 Additional claims take more
time to draft and present more opportunities for the Patent Office
to issue a rejection. Applicants may therefore be more likely to
take on the cost of more claims when they have a stronger belief
that the patent has value in the marketplace. Again, an
expectation of higher value should correspond with additional
risky behavior.
Of course, we did not limit our data gathering to only
characteristics that had support as indicators of patent value. We
expect that the characteristics noted above will be the most
distinct if the doctrine of inequitable conduct is operating as
theorized. We discuss our data in more detail below.
B. Data
Five separate datasets of patents were created to supply the
data necessary for this study. Except as otherwise described
below, all patent data was obtained from that made public by the
USPTO34 or the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for
Presumption of Validity 32 (Stan. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 401,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1656568## (studying the use of applicant-submitted prior art).
It has also been argued that inequitable conduct doctrine encourages the
overdisclosure of information to the Patent Office. See Cotropia, supra, note 27,
at 770–72 (“[T]he doctrine incentivizes the patent applicant to err on the side of
quantity.”); Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 770–75 (2011) (describing
when patent applicants would choose disclosure over nondisclosure). These
claims have yet to make contact with observations but suggest the possibility
that applicants with an expectation of value for a nascent patent will take on
the cost of searching for and disclosing more information to the Patent Office.
See id. (offering predictions).
33. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44
(2002) (estimating the current administrative costs of obtaining a U.S. patent).
34. See Electronic Data Products, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/products/catalog/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 19, 2013)
(providing public patent and trademark data) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Bulk USPTO data is also made available by a partnership
between the USPTO and Google, and is hosted by Google. See USPTO Bulk
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Patent Data Project.35 Official USPTO data in bulk form is
readily available for all U.S. patents granted after January 1,
1976.36 Patents issued before 1976, therefore, are not part of our
datasets.
Unenforceable patents. The data collection technique used for
unenforceable patents has been discussed in detail elsewhere.37
Briefly, a dataset of unenforceable patents was established by
collecting every decision involving inequitable conduct made by
the Federal Circuit, beginning with the creation of the court and
ending May 27, 2010. The decisions were collected by searching
the term “inequitable conduct” in the LEXIS “Federal Circuit,
U.S. Court of Appeals” database, but the data was supplemented
by a similar search of the Westlaw “U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Cases)” database. The decisions returned were
coded for whether the court issued a mandate of inequitable
conduct. Multiple human coders were used and intercoder
agreement was assessed by calculating Cohen’s Kappa.38 The
value calculated was 0.944, which indicates nearly perfect
agreement.39 Intercoder disagreements were identified and
corrected. The patent numbers of unenforceable patents were
collected based on information in the decisions. Given the
limitation that patents had to be issued at least as recently as
1976, our unenforceable patents dataset includes 95 patents.
Invalid 112 patents. This dataset was constructed by
collecting every decision involving enablement, written
Downloads:
Patents,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/usptopatents.html (last visited July 5, 2013) [hereinafter GOOGLE] (providing data)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See Patent Data Project, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ (last visited July 5, 2013)
(providing data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See GOOGLE, supra note 34 (deriving a dataset).
37. See supra Part I (discussing data collection for unenforceable patents);
see also Petherbridge et. al., supra note 20, at 1303–08 (describing data
collection).
38. See Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20
EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37, 39–46 (1960) (describing the method of
determining the coefficient of agreement between two judges).
39. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer
Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977) (discussing
kappa values); see also JOSEPH L. FLEISS, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND
PROPORTIONS 218 (2d ed. 1981) (same).
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description, or best mode. These are all requirements for
patentability that have a statutory basis in 35 U.S.C § 112, ¶ 1
(“112 patents”),40 made by the Federal Circuit, beginning with the
creation of the court and ending June 11, 2012. The decisions
were collected by querying the LEXIS “Federal Circuit, U.S.
Court of Appeals” database, with the search terms: 35 U.S.C. /2
112 and (“written description” or “enable” or “enablement” or
“best mode”) and valid! or invalid!. The decisions returned were
coded for whether the court issued a mandate of invalidity on a
theory of lack of adequate disclosure. Multiple human coders
were used and intercoder agreement was assessed. Cohen’s
Kappa was calculated as 1.000. The patent numbers of invalid
112 patents were collected based on information in the decisions.
Given the limitation that patents had to be issued at least as
recently as 1976, our invalid 112 patents dataset includes 80
patents.
Obvious patents. This dataset was constructed by collecting
every decision involving obviousness (a requirement for
patentability that has its statutory basis in 35 U.S.C § 103)41
made by the Federal Circuit, beginning January 1, 1990, and
ending June 15, 2012. Decisions issued between January 1, 1990,
and May 25, 2005, were collected as reported in Petherbridge &
Wagner.42 Briefly, the LEXIS Federal Circuit database was
searched with the terms “patent and obvious.” Decisions issued
between May 25, 2005, and June 15, 2012, were collected by
querying the LEXIS “Federal Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals”
database, with the search terms: “patent and atl4(obvious!) or
atl3(nonobvious!).” Multiple human coders were used and
intercoder agreement assessed. Cohen’s Kappa was calculated as
0.98. The patent numbers of obvious patents were collected based
on information in the decisions. Given the limitation that patents
had to be issued at least as recently as 1976, our obvious patents
dataset includes 235 patents.

40. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
42. See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2051, 2071–74 (2007) (describing research methods and listing 480 total
records between January 1, 1990, and June 1, 2005, from which to collect data).
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Litigated patents. Research about the patent system, and
particularly patent litigation, has long been hampered by a lack
of good data about litigated patents. To address this limitation,
we attempted to discover all patents litigated from January 1,
1976, through August 23, 2011. We used the relevant LEXIS
database, which includes Patent Office litigation notices, as well
as Westlaw-Litalert, which includes information from Derwent
about which patents have been litigated. Approximately
4,075,707 patents issued during the thirty-five-year period
studied, and we discovered 36,594 distinct patents litigated
during the period. That results in a litigation rate across the
period of 0.90%. While the historical rate of patent litigation is
unknown, it is commonly estimated to be about 1%.43 Assuming
that estimate is correct, we believe we have collected at minimum
a very substantial proportion of all patents litigated between
1976 and 2011. From the 36,594 litigated patents, we randomly
selected 1,000 for use as our dataset of litigated patents. In
analyzing the data, we made no effort to remove unenforceable
patents from the dataset of litigated patents. The reason is that
unenforceable patents are so rare that it is unlikely they will
appear in large enough numbers to be concerning in a randomly
selected set of litigated patents.44
Unlitigated patents. From a set of all patents issued between
January 1, 1976, and August 23, 2011, we collected a random
sample of 1,000 patents. Because of the very low rate of patent
litigation, we made no effort to remove litigated or unenforceable
patents from these data.
Variables. For each patent in the datasets, we collected
bibliographic data concerning the parameters along which our
design hypothesizes that litigated patents might differ from
unenforceable patents. Variables were collected using custommade Perl scripts, or custom-made python scripts operating on
the original data sources; Table 1 lists these.

43. See Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy
Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 548 (2000)
(estimating litigation rates).
44. We checked anyway, and discovered two unenforceable patents in the
litigated patents dataset.
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III. Results and Discussion

The basic statistics for the variables in our datasets are
shown in Table 2, below.
Table 2: Summary Statistics, All Datasets
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As Table 2 indicates, there are differences in the
measurements for many of the variables across datasets. For
example, unenforceable patents have significantly longer
pendencies (overallpend) than litigated patents, and both
unenforceable and litigated patents have longer pendencies than
unlitigated patents. In addition, unenforceable patents have more
claims (numclaims) and more parent applications (parents) than
litigated patents, which in turn surpass unlitigated patents on
both measures. Note that prior art citations (totalref) differ
interestingly across datasets: unenforceable patents have far
fewer citations to prior art than invalid, obvious, or invalid 112
patents (though more than unlitigated patents). This will turn
out to be important, and we return to this point later.
Next, we developed a regression model to compare the
differences between litigated and unlitigated patents. As noted in
our discussion of the research design, there is increasing
awareness among scholars about these differences, so this
exercise is presented as both a check on our methods and a proof
of the developing wisdom. Table 3 reports these results.
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Table 3: Litigated vs. Unlitigated Patents

Our findings in Table 3 are broadly consistent with other
studies. Litigated patents differ quite substantially from
unlitigated patents: Litigated patents have longer pendencies,
more claims, cite more references, and are more likely to have a
U.S. inventor. Drug and medical patents are also much more
likely to be litigated than other types. Again, these findings are
consistent with our methodological theory: patents that are the
subject of litigation are measurably (and statistically
significantly) different from those that are not.
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The next step in our analysis was to assess whether what we
call “intensely litigated patents”—those litigated to final
judgment at the Federal Circuit—are likewise significantly
different from litigated patents, and in turn unlitigated patents.
Table 4 reports these results.
Table 4: Intensely Litigated Patents vs. Unlitigated Patents, vs.
Litigated Patents

As with the model comparing litigated and unlitigated
patents, we find statistically significant differences between
intensely litigated patents and both litigated and unlitigated
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patents along several dimensions. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
risk-associated explanatory variables more strongly distinguish
intensely litigated patents from unlitigated patents than they do
from litigated patents. Nevertheless, differences between
intensely litigated patents and litigated patents are strongly
significant. Intensely litigated patents (compared to litigated
patents) are longer pending, have more claims, and are (again)
overrepresented by drug and medical patents. Interestingly,
although intensely litigated patents have, statistically,
significantly more prior art references than unlitigated patents,
this relationship does not hold for litigated patents. The reason
for this is revealed by subsequent models, below.45
In addition, the finding that intensely litigated patents are
significantly different from patents that are merely the subject of
litigation reveals that not all litigated patents are necessarily
alike. This novel finding is encouraging in that it is consistent
with our methodological expectations. It should, moreover, have
implications for future work concerning litigated patents.
Depending on the research question, it may be appropriate to
account for the extent to which a patent is litigated in research
design.46
Table 5 reports how unenforceable patents compare to
unlitigated patents, litigated patents, and invalid patents. Invalid
patents, as we noted in Part III, are those patents that have been
declared invalid by the Federal Circuit on the basis of
obviousness (under 35 U.S.C. § 103), or lack of enabling
disclosure, adequate description, or disclosure of best mode
(under 35 U.S.C. § 112).

45. See tables infra Part III.
46. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value
or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 11–12 (2009) (examining frequently litigated patents and describing a
statistical analysis approach).
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Table 5: Unenforceable Patents vs. Unlitigated, vs. Litigated,
vs. Invalid

Table 5 indicates that unenforceable patents have different
characteristics from invalid patents. Although invalid patents
and unenforceable patents are both litigated to a decision on
appeal, unenforceable patents have a longer pendency and a
greater number of claims (though the difference with the invalid
patents is only marginally significant) than both litigated and
invalid patents. There are two additional important observations in
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Table 5. First, and most strikingly, the number of prior art
references (totalref) shows clearly as a differentiating
characteristic in the litigated and invalid models—meaning that
unenforceable patents cite statistically significantly fewer prior
art references than do litigated or invalid patents. In fact,
unenforceable patents appear to cite prior art references at a
level similar to that of unlitigated patents.47 Second,
unenforceable patents also differ from invalid patents along
subject matter lines: compared to invalid patents, unenforceable
patents are more likely to be directed to innovations in chemistry,
electronics, and mechanics than to innovations in drugs or
computers.
Finally, in order to explore further the differences between
unenforceable patents and others—and thus evaluate the way the
doctrine of inequitable conduct operates—we built a regression
model comparing unenforceable patents to the other two datasets
involving intensely litigated patents: those found invalid for
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 at the Federal Circuit, and
those found invalid for lack of disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 at
the Federal Circuit. Table 6 reports these results.

47. All else being equal, this might indicate that unenforceable patents
could be characterized as “accidentally litigated” patents. This notion is
substantially undercut, however, by the fact that unenforceable patents pend
significantly longer and have significantly more claims than unlitigated patents.
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Table 6: Unenforceable Patents vs. Obvious, vs. Undisclosed

Here again, perhaps the most striking finding is with respect
to prior art references: unenforceable patents cite statistically
significantly fewer prior art references than do obvious or
undisclosed patents. Unenforceable patents, in addition, pend
longer and have more claims than obvious patents. Unenforceable
patents also appear to differ from 112 patents, although perhaps
not as extremely. Unenforceable patents appear not to have more
claims than such patents, nonetheless they do pend longer, and
the difference in the number of cited prior art references remains
strong.
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IV. Implications and Discussion

As discussed in Part II above,48 this project seeks to analyze
the performance of the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct
by exploiting differences between sets of patents affected by
litigation. And primarily Tables 5 and 6 reveal a pattern of patent
characteristics from which one can draw some inferences about
the doctrine of inequitable conduct. Our discussion here proceeds
as follows: First, we discuss the core finds of the data analysis—
in particular that patents held unenforceable have statistically
significantly fewer citations to prior art than other similarly
litigated patents—and consider what these findings suggest
about the operational performance of the inequitable conduct
doctrine in the real world of patent litigation. Second, we explore
possible alternative explanations for our results. Third, we draw
some tentative conclusions about how to think about the role of
inequitable conduct in the patent system, based on our findings.
And finally, we offer some thoughts on the potential for future
research for the methods developed in this project.
A. Our Results
Given the policing theory of inequitable conduct doctrine, we
hypothesized that if the doctrine aligned well with its theory,
then unenforceable patents might be different than other patents.
More specifically, we thought unenforceable patents would be
both:
1. Relatively more valuable than other patents (the
risk/reward ratio means that the applicant must
believe there is substantial value); and
2. Characterized by risky behavior in prosecution.
Perhaps the most revealing result of our study is that those
patents found unenforceable have statistically significantly fewer
citations to prior art than patents in other similarly tested
groups. This is consistent with the doctrinal theory. In
prosecution, applicants might sometimes risk later discovery of a
48.

See discussion supra Part II.A.
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withheld reference in order to get valuable claims allowed.
Unenforceable patents, moreover, not only distinguish
themselves from all other patents litigated to any degree in terms
of their lack of reference to prior art, but they are also apparently
among the most complex patents in our data in that they surpass
all patents, including all other intensely litigated patents, in
length of pendency, and nearly all other patents in number of
claims. No set of patents had significantly more claims than
unenforceable patents. It thus appears that unenforceable
patents, while being among the most complex patents we
examined, nonetheless make reference to the fewest pieces of
prior art. It is this juxtaposition of characteristics—which
obviously does not itself reveal inequitable conduct—that is
consistent with what we might expect to observe given the theory.
Our findings are, therefore, consistent with the conclusion
that inequitable conduct doctrine aligns well with its underlying
theory. But we cannot claim an empirically airtight case. It is
worth considering some of the explanations that might be
available to describe why unenforceable patents, arguably the
most complex set of patents we observe, reference the fewest
pieces of prior art.
B. Possible Alternative Explanations
Although we think our results are most naturally interpreted
in the manner described above, it is worth considering alternative
explanations for the patterns of relationships our study reveals.
Alternative 1: “Pioneering” patents are more likely to be
(erroneously) found unenforceable. “Pioneering” patents—those
directed to especially innovative ideas—might also be expected to
cite less prior art, for the reason that they are significant
technological advances, and thus have less relevant sources of
prior art (and consequently fewer citations to prior art). So
perhaps our results might reveal that such patents are
particularly susceptible to being identified (perhaps erroneously)
as unenforceable by litigation. We think this is unlikely. First,
our findings also suggest that unenforceable patents are
characterized by long prosecution pendency, which is not
consistent with the idea that less prior art is available to deploy
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against the application. Indeed, it suggests the opposite: One
predicts that pioneering patents, while perhaps subject to greater
scrutiny under § 10149 (for subject matter and perhaps utility)
would be relatively easy to allow. The relative lack of art should
result in short prosecution pendency, not encourage exceptionally
long pending applications.50 Second, we think there is little
reason to suggest that the process of determining inequitable
conduct (in other words, determining materiality and intent)
should disproportionately target pioneer patents. And third, our
experience in reading many of the cases that describe inequitable
conduct does not suggest that patents found unenforceable are
especially novel or innovative.51
Alternative 2: The intuition of the patent litigator. One
possible explanation is that patent litigators sense patent
characteristics, such as relatively few patent references, that
suggest that the patent is particularly vulnerable to assertions of
inequitable conduct—whether or not such conduct has occurred.
They then aggressively act on this intuition, seeking to convince
judges via the arts of advocacy and rhetoric that an applicant
engaged in inequitable conduct. The basic idea here is that even
in view of our results, we cannot rule out the possibility that we
are observing some sort of artifact or flaw in the doctrine that
defendants are able to exploit even when inequitable conduct has
not genuinely occurred. We think this is somewhat unlikely; the
unenforceable patents in our dataset were the subjects of
extremely intense litigation, including an appeal to the Federal
Circuit. Although lawyerly skill is clearly important, we doubt
(though cannot definitively rule out) that it could systematically
account for the patterns we find in our results.

49. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”).
50. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent
Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1069 (2003) (“[I]t costs more to carry out
more thorough prior art searches, and larger numbers of prior art references . . .
correlate even more strongly with longer pendency times than the number of
claims does.”).
51. See, e.g., Petherbridge et. al., supra note 20, at 1308–29 (examining the
content of all federal circuit inequitable conduct opinions).

UNENFORCEABILITY

1777

Alternative 3: Unobserved effects. As with all empirical
analyses, there may well be important drivers to the selection of
patents for unenforceability that we cannot measure, and thus
cannot account for in our methods.
C. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Generates Beneficial
Incentives
We think our results, on balance, paint a relatively positive
picture of the inequitable conduct doctrine. The doctrine seems to
be working as expected, targeting patents that are significantly
different than other similarly tested patents—and different in
ways that the theory of the doctrine as serving a policing function
would predict.
What we find most important about our findings, however, is
that it allows us to conclude with some confidence that the
inequitable conduct doctrine does not act randomly in the real
world. There are indeed statistically significant differences in the
characteristics of patents held unenforceable versus other types
of patents, even those litigated in similar fashion. What that
means is that the inequitable conduct doctrine is (or at least
should be) generating incentives for certain behavior among
patent applicants. If the converse were true, if the inequitable
conduct doctrine appeared to apply randomly across patent
characteristics, then the doctrine would not be generating any
specific behavior other than generally reducing incentives to
obtain patents.52
What incentives do we think the doctrine is creating? It
should encourage patent applicants to reduce the characteristics
we identified above as associated with unenforceability: longer
pendency, more claims, and fewer prior art references. Put
another way, the findings show that the doctrine of inequitable
conduct should be encouraging patentees to offer less complex
patents (fewer claims), engage in simpler prosecution (lower
pendency), and provide more prior art references. To be sure,
there are other factors that may encourage this sort of behavior,
52. The intuition here is that if some n% of patents were held
unenforceable at random, then the incentive to obtain a patent would be
correspondingly reduced.
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as well as factors pointing the other direction. But our results
suggest that the doctrine should have a generally positive effect
on the mix of incentives that drive patenting behavior.
Thus, one implication of our study is that eliminating the
doctrine of inequitable conduct may be a mistake. Patents held
unenforceable are uniquely complex, pend for a long time, and
cite less prior art. This is not, we think, a good combination; the
doctrine is probably working reasonably well.
In addition, we do not see in our results any clear need to
tweak the doctrinal framework. Indeed we were surprised how
well our findings aligned with the way that we expected the
doctrine to work. This is not to say the doctrine is perfect, but
that over the long run, it seems to be having a real-world impact
in the direction that one would expect.
It is worth acknowledging what our results are unlikely to
reveal about inequitable conduct. As we noted above, there is a
widely held—although empirically unverified—view that the
doctrine is over-asserted in patent litigation. Our findings shed
relatively little light on the assertion that inequitable conduct is
so often alleged that there is a “plague” of inequitable conduct
claims.53 We do not count assertions or attempt to measure the
litigation costs of failed assertions and the ex-ante effects of the
fear of being accused of inequitable conduct. The data presented
here, therefore, does not reach the question of whether there are
too many inequitable conduct allegations in patent cases.
The most important thing these data cannot answer,
perhaps, is whether the doctrine is efficient. That is, whether the
types of behavior targeted by inequitable conduct could be
addressed in more cost-effective ways. Any analysis of costefficiency would necessarily have to account for the substantial
costs of the doctrine in terms of litigation and prosecution
incentives. So while it may be the case that inequitable conduct
encourages beneficial applicant behavior, the doctrine might also
create such large incentives for defendants to assert it that the
incidence of assertions far outweighs the level that would make
the doctrine effective from a cost–benefit standpoint. For
53. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing allegations of inequitable conduct as a “plague”);
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (same (quoting Burlington Industries, 849 F.2d at 1422)).
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example, it might be that rather than use inequitable conduct as
a policing mechanism to force better disclosure of prior art, the
patent law should simply require more disclosure from
applicants—a prior art search, perhaps.54 A search requirement
would at least partially address our results (the relatively lower
incidence of prior art citations).55 But the reality is that we do not
have a search requirement; until we do, it appears that the
doctrine of inequitable conduct can provide some of the desired
behavioral incentives.
Nonetheless, what our findings do suggest is that the
inequitable conduct doctrine performs in the real world in a way
that aligns well with the doctrine’s theoretical purpose. In a
sense, this does respond to the criticism we noted above: the
doctrine appears to be working as intended. Patents are not
randomly being declared unenforceable. Thus, there is, we think,
evidence of value in the doctrine from our results.
D. Implications for Future Work
Another important aspect of our findings is that they suggest
that our methodological approach to measuring the performance
of the inequitable conduct doctrine—by studying the patterns of
difference among the patents on which it operates—has promise
in other areas. By exploiting the commonality of patents among
patent litigations, as well as the easily measurable
characteristics of patents, we think there are new insights
available into doctrinal performance across patent law. This is
not to suggest that more traditional ways of evaluating case law
are not useful, but that the approach described in this paper may
represent a new way of thinking about how patent doctrine meets
patent policy.

54. See, e.g., H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing amendment to title
35 of the United States Code to require an applicant to a business method
patent to disclose the extent to which the applicant searched for prior art).
55. See Kevin M. Baird, Note, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the
USPTO or Business as Usual?, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 347, 360–62
(2001) (suggesting requiring a mandatory prior art search by the patentee).
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V. Conclusion

Inequitable conduct doctrine engenders stronger feelings
than perhaps any other patent doctrine. It is at the center of a
battle for control over the substantive law of patentability that
pits patent applicants against the courts and the Patent Office.
The details of the doctrine are taught in every serious patent
course offered by every serious law school. Yet somehow,
remarkably little is known about whether there is a real-world
link between inequitable conduct doctrine and patent policy.
This study takes a step towards unfurling some of the
complexity of inequitable conduct law and policy. It empirically
examines patents that have been determined unenforceable for
inequitable conduct and reports evidence that unenforceable
patents are significantly different from other types of patents.
Unenforceable patents have significantly longer pendency, more
parent applications, and contain more claims. Unenforceable
patents also cite fewer prior art references. Based on these
observations, this report raises empirically grounded hypotheses
concerning inequitable conduct that should be useful to legal
scholars and practitioners.

